[meta-security][PATCH 3/4] meta-integrity: YCL fixups
We wont need the linux-% once the kernel-feature class is included in
core. Move the inherit into the image itself. Drop kernel patches not being used. Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@...> --- .../images/integrity-image-minimal.bb | 2 + .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend | 5 - .../0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch | 51 ------- ...for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch | 138 ------------------ ...-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch | 60 -------- 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 254 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch diff --git a/meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb b/meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb index 1a3a30a..4e7895a 100644 --- a/meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb +++ b/meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ IMAGE_INSTALL = "\ LICENSE = "MIT" inherit core-image +inherit ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'modsign', 'kernel-modsign', '', d)} + export IMAGE_BASENAME = "integrity-image-minimal" diff --git a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend b/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend deleted file mode 100644 index f9a48cd..0000000 --- a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -KERNEL_FEATURES_append = " ${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "ima", " features/ima/ima.scc", "" ,d)}" - -KERNEL_FEATURES_append = " ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'modsign', ' features/ima/modsign.scc', '', d)}" - -inherit ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'modsign', 'kernel-modsign', '', d)} diff --git a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch b/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 64016dd..0000000 --- a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From 45ea681ebc0dd44aaec5d3cc4143b9722070d3ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...> -Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 16:43:55 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH] ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr - -Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to -re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file" -status nor the security.ima xattr. The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and -IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific. This patch -only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags. - -With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the -file signature on new files. - -Upstream-Status: Accepted [https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c?id=42a4c603198f0d45b7aa936d3ac6ba1b8bd14a1b] - -Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@...> -Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...> ---- - security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- - security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -index 4df493e..a384ba1 100644 ---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) - if (iint) { - iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | - IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | -- IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); -+ IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS); - if (must_appraise) - iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE; - } -diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h -index 0fc9519..f9decae 100644 ---- a/security/integrity/integrity.h -+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - - /* iint cache flags */ - #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 -+#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x06000000 - #define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 - #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 - #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 --- -2.5.0 - diff --git a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch b/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6ab7ce2..0000000 --- a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,138 +0,0 @@ -From baaec960e9e7be0b526eaf831b079ddfe5c15124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...> -Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 18:19:20 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat - syscall - -Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files" -stopped identifying empty files as new files. However new empty files -can be created using the mknodat syscall. On systems with IMA-appraisal -enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended -attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in -order to write the file data contents. This patch marks these empty -files, created using mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data -contents to be written. - -Files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature are considered -"immutable" and can not be modified. The file contents need to be -written, before signing the file. This patch relaxes this requirement -for new files, allowing the file signature to be written before the file -contents. - -Upstream-Status: Accepted [https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c?id=05d1a717ec0430c916a749b94eb90ab74bbfa356] - -Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...> ---- - fs/namei.c | 2 ++ - include/linux/ima.h | 7 ++++++- - security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 +++ - security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c -index ccd7f98..19502da 100644 ---- a/fs/namei.c -+++ b/fs/namei.c -@@ -3526,6 +3526,8 @@ retry: - switch (mode & S_IFMT) { - case 0: case S_IFREG: - error = vfs_create(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,true); -+ if (!error) -+ ima_post_path_mknod(dentry); - break; - case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: - error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode, -diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h -index 120ccc5..7f51971 100644 ---- a/include/linux/ima.h -+++ b/include/linux/ima.h -@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); - extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); - extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file); - extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); -- -+extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); - #else - static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) - { -@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) - return 0; - } - -+static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) -+{ -+ return; -+} -+ - #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE -diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -index 4df493e..20806ea 100644 ---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -@@ -274,6 +274,11 @@ out: - xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { - if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) - status = INTEGRITY_PASS; -+ } else if ((inode->i_size == 0) && -+ (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && -+ (xattr_value && -+ xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { -+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS; - } - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, - op, cause, rc, 0); -diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c -index eeee00dc..705bf78 100644 ---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c -+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c -@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function, - ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); - - out_digsig: -- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)) -+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) && -+ !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) - rc = -EACCES; - kfree(xattr_value); - out_free: -@@ -310,6 +311,35 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); - - /** -+ * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode -+ * @dentry: newly created dentry -+ * -+ * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the -+ * file data can be written later. -+ */ -+void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) -+{ -+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; -+ struct inode *inode; -+ int must_appraise; -+ -+ if (!dentry || !dentry->d_inode) -+ return; -+ -+ inode = dentry->d_inode; -+ if (inode->i_size != 0) -+ return; -+ -+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); -+ if (!must_appraise) -+ return; -+ -+ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); -+ if (iint) -+ iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; -+} -+ -+/** - * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement. - * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised - * --- -2.5.0 - diff --git a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch b/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 157c007..0000000 --- a/meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From a34d61850b680c152e1dcc958ee83c3ab3261c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@...> -Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 10:10:23 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log - modes" - -This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533. - -The original motivation was security hardening ("File hashes are -automatically set and updated and should not be manually set.") - -However, that hardening ignores and breaks some valid use cases: -- File hashes might not be set because the file is currently - outside of the policy and therefore have to be set by the - creator. Examples: - - Booting into an initramfs with an IMA-enabled kernel but - without setting an IMA policy, then installing - the OS onto the target partition by unpacking a rootfs archive - which has the file hashes pre-computed. - - Unpacking a file into a staging area with meta data (like owner) - that leaves the file outside of the current policy, then changing - the meta data such that it becomes part of the current policy. -- "should not be set manually" implies that the creator is aware - of IMA semantic, the current system's configuration, and then - skips setting file hashes in security.ima if (and only if) the - kernel would prevent it. That's not the case for standard, unmodified - tools. Example: unpacking an archive with security.ima xattrs with - bsdtar or GNU tar. - -Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/35492824/] - -Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@...> ---- - security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++------ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -index 4b9b4a4..b8b2dd9 100644 ---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c -@@ -385,14 +385,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len); - if (result == 1) { -- bool digsig; -- - if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) - return -EINVAL; -- digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); -- if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) -- return -EPERM; -- ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); -+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), -+ (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); - result = 0; - } - return result; --- -2.1.4 - -- 2.25.1 |
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